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The	UK	and	the	EU:	Another	two-level	game
The	prospects	for	a	post-Brexit	trade	deal	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	look	increasingly	bleak	following	talks
between	EU	leaders	on	15	October.	Bob	Hancké	attempts	to	make	sense	of	the	negotiations.
Finally,	the	gloves	are	off.	French	president	Macron,	a	bit	more	preoccupied	with	containing	a	new	outbreak	of
Covid-19	than	with	Brexit,	has	turned	the	tables	and	told	Boris	Johnson	to	‘go	whistle’.	If	the	UK	wants	a	Brexit
agreement	before	the	end	of	the	year,	it	is	going	to	have	to	accept	the	EU’s	conditions,	point	final.	UK	waters
should	remain	open	for	EU	(especially	French)	fishing	boats,	the	UK	should	accept	it	will	have	to	dynamically
ratchet	up	environmental	and	social	standards	if	it	wants	to	trade	with	the	EU,	and	state	aid	should	be	contained	to
the	level	acceptable	within	the	bloc.
Ignore	for	a	moment	the	outsized	role	that	fish	plays	in	this	story	(though	more	as	an	object	than	a	subject	–	I	bet
some	fish	are	hoping	for	a	breakdown	of	the	talks).	If	Macron	had	any	sense	of	French	history,	he	would
understand	the	power	of	small	but	symbolic	communities:	for	years,	French	farmers	held	reform	of	the	CAP	hostage
because	it	would	destroy	the	typical	French	relationship	that	the	French	(cuisine)	has	with	the	terroir.	Ignore	also
the	slightly	hallucinating	notion	that	the	party	of	Margaret	Thatcher	insists	on	a	free	hand	in	doling	out	money	to
new	(and	old)	industries	both	to	safeguard	livelihoods	and	to	bask	in	the	‘white	heat	of	technology’	again.	What	is
truly	interesting	here	is	that	the	EU	has	now,	supposedly,	drawn	its	own	red	lines	to	face	off	those	that	the	UK	has
drawn	since	the	2016	referendum.
A	double	two-level	game
A	few	years	ago,	I	analysed	the	Brexit	strategy	of	the	UK	government	(a	bunch	of	red	lines)	as	a	misconceived	two-
level	game	(2LG):	if	you	are	no	longer	a	part	of	the	relationship,	your	‘and	I	want	you	to	do	this’	style	of	negotiating
has	very	little	power,	because	there	is	no	credible	‘or	else’	that	you	can	add	or	even	imply.	Invoking	domestic
constituencies	as	constraints	in	international	negotiations	to	leverage	the	outcome	in	your	favour	only	works	if	you
display	a	fundamental	commitment	to	the	arrangement	that	you	are	trying	to	change.	It’s	safe	to	say	that	the	Brexit
decision	and	the	implementation	since	early	2017	killed	that.
Michel	Barnier,	EU	Chief	Brexit	Negotiator,	and	Charles	Michel,	President	of	the	European	Council,	at	a	press	conference	on	15	October	2020,	Credit:	European
Council
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By	making	the	EU’s	position	as	hard	as	this,	we	now	effectively	face	a	‘double	2LG’,	with	hard	red	lines	on	both
sides.	I	don’t	think	I	have	ever	seen	this	before:	usually	one	of	the	parties	is	more	committed,	and	thinks	that	any
deal	is	better	than	no	deal.	So,	we	are	living	through	a	natural	experiment.	If	both	parties	simultaneously	reduce
their	win-set,	the	Venn	diagram	may	suddenly	end	up	with	an	empty	overlapping	intersection.	A	hard	Brexit,	the
Australian	option,	name	it	what	you	will,	heralds	a	collapse	of	trade	talks,	the	end	of	friendly	neighbourhood
relations,	and	a	weakening	of	both	parties.	That	is	a	pretty	steep	price	to	pay	for	a	handful	of	fish.
Or	a	chicken	game?
Of	course,	the	negotiations	may	have	stopped	being	a	2LG	a	while	ago.	Imagine	that	Macron	is	difficult	for	other
reasons	than	trying	to	resist	the	Anglo-Saxon	aggressor	(the	parallels	with	Asterix	the	Gaul	are	a	bit	eery).	Like
everyone	else,	he	is	tired	of	the	melodrama	on	the	other	side	of	the	Channel,	and	corona	is	eating	up	a	lot	of	the
governing	energy.	By	stating	the	obvious	–	trading	with	us,	the	largest	single	market	in	the	world,	means	accepting
our	rules	–	Macron	mobilises	the	power	of	the	EU	to	force	the	UK	to	concede	first.
The	negotiations	thus	seem	to	have	morphed	into	a	chicken	game:	two	cars	race	toward	each	other	and	the	one	to
veer	first	loses	the	contest.	Both	cars	being	of	roughly	the	same	size,	there	are	only	losers	if	no	one	veers.	Yet	what
is	perhaps	not	entirely	understood	in	the	UK	is	that	this	is	not	a	standard	chicken	game	with	two	more	or	less	similar
cars,	but	a	situation	where	one	party	drives	a	large	truck	and	the	other	a	motorbike.	That	collision	will	not	have
symmetric	effects,	therefore.	The	EU	is	simply	banking	on	the	Johnson	government	seeing	that	too,	coming	to	its
senses,	and	accepting	the	EU’s	not	entirely	unreasonable	demands.
A	simple	2LG,	actually
But	what	if	something	far	more	subtle	is	going	on?	Acting	tough	now,	the	EU	actually	offers	the	Johnson
government	a	face-saving	exit.	The	imposition	of	such	hard	(and,	according	to	the	British	press,	unpalatable)
conditions	implies	that	the	road	is	open	for	a	negotiation	that	will	almost	certainly	look	like	a	victory	for	the	UK.	Any
EU	concession	it	can	now	show	to	the	audience	back	home	will	be	portrayed	as	a	Churchillian	moment:	the	new
Jerusalem	will	be	built	on	the	founding	myth	that	‘we	fought	them	in	the	tunnel’—the	long,	secret,	24/7	endgame
negotiations.
Johnson	has	form	in	this	regard:	the	deal	he	negotiated	last	year	with	the	EU	was,	actually,	from	the	UK’s
perspective	a	weaker	deal	than	the	one	negotiated	by	his	predecessor	Theresa	May	and	which	he	refused	to
countenance	as	a	member	of	the	cabinet	at	the	time.	Walking	out	of	a	room,	waving	a	sheet	of	paper,	shouting
‘Brexit	in	our	time’	goes	down	well	with	the	Eurosceptic	press,	of	course,	and	the	EU’s	hard	stance	assures	that	any
success	now	will	be	seen	as	hard-fought.
Since	the	future	is	difficult	to	predict,	as	Mark	Twain	suggested,	I	won’t	place	any	bets	on	which	of	these	logics	is	at
play	here	–	the	double	2LG,	the	asymmetric	chicken	game,	or	the	hidden	simple	2LG.	But	the	endgame	is	on,	so
much	is	clear.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	European	Council
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